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Abstract: The legal origin literature documents that civil and common law traditions have different 
impacts on economic outcomes. We contribute to this literature by formulating and testing 
hypotheses on the effect of legal origins on corporate social responsibility, overall and in different 
specific dimensions. We find that, net of industry-specific effects, companies in common law 
countries score higher in corporate governance and community involvement, while those in 
countries belonging to the French legal tradition of civil law do better in human resources. We also 
observe no significant differences in terms of environmental protection among companies in civil 
and common law countries, which we attribute to a progressive convergence towards common 
industry sustainability standards. 
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1. Introduction 
Advertising social and environmentally friendly behavior, issuing sustainability reports, and 
hiring Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR, hereon) experts has increasingly become corporate 
practice in the most recent years [1]. The growing relevance of CSR is leading academicians to reflect 
on whether the latter represents a major change in the economic paradigm with respect to the 
standard approach. In this approach, forces of market competition transform individual and 
corporate self-interested behavior into an efficient and socially optimal outcome, while the state 
intervenes with taxes and regulation to address the problem of externalities and public goods 
redistributing income and wealth according to the dominating social standards [2]. In this 
framework, the invisible hand of the market and the “visible” hand of institutions are sufficient to 
ensure socially optimal outcomes without the need for an explicit voluntary corporate effort toward 
social responsibility. 
The demand for CSR has emerged mainly in recent decades. CSR was an almost irrelevant issue 
in pre-globalization high-income economies, where domestically producing firms already strived in 
high-income countries to comply with demanding domestic social and environmental rules and did 
not have much room for additional voluntary compliance to above the law standards. Quite to the 
contrary, in globally integrated economies in which production is delocalized in countries where 
legal standards are low, the role of CSR is becoming progressively more important in the eyes of 
consumers, domestic institutions, and investors [3]. We implicitly refer here to the EU Commission 
[4] definition of CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. 
From a different point of view, based on standard CSR measures (see also Appendix B), we may 
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consider CSR as a move from the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth to the more complex goal 
of satisfying the wellbeing of a broader range of stakeholders. 
According to the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance [5], socially responsible investments 
totaled $30.7 trillion, an increase of 34% from 2016 and account for 18% of total assets under 
management in Japan, 63% in Australia and New Zealand, and 49% in Europe Exclusionary screens 
remains the dominant strategy with €9.5 Trillion. A global survey on consumers documents that the 
share of respondents saying that it is extremely important for companies to implement programs to 
improve the environment is 72% among baby boomers and 85% among millennials, with a 
geographical distribution showing higher sensitivity in Asia, Africa, and Latin America with respect 
to Europe and the United States [6]. Even though the willingness to pay for CSR tends to be upward 
biased, as documented by the contingent evaluation literature [7], these figures reveal that the 
phenomenon is quantitatively relevant.  
As is well known from a theoretical point of view, adoption of CSR entails extra costs to satisfy 
the needs of stakeholders, which can be compensated by several potential benefits related to 
productivity of intrinsically motivated workers, reduced turnover, development of technological 
leadership in environmental innovation, lower transaction costs with stakeholders and higher 
demand from concerned consumers. This is why the empirical literature finds mixed results on the 
nexus between CSR and corporate performance [8]. However, while most of the literature has focused 
so far on the nexus between CSR and corporate performance, few empirical contributions analyze 
nowadays how different legal cultures affect CSR choices around the world (see [9] and [10], among 
others). This is the goal of our paper. 
If markets are “embedded” in human societies and shaped by their socio-political contextual 
features [11], a relevant benchmark reference to start our investigation on the nexus between CSR 
and different country cultures is the legal origin literature. In their survey of this literature, La Porta 
et al. [12] argued that historical origins of domestic legal systems deeply affect legal rules, regulatory 
practices, and economic outcomes. As is well known, they identified two main roots, namely civil 
and common law, giving birth to four legal families, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon for the common law and 
the French, the German, and the Scandinavian for the civil law.  
From an historical point of view, common law is generally considered as taking origin from the 
desire of land aristocrats and merchants to limit the power of the crown, while the French version of 
civil law from the Napoleon desire to “use state power to alter property rights” and in an attempt “to 
insure that judges did not interfere” [12]. Due to these heterogeneous historical roots, two markedly 
different cultures originated from civil and common law, with state control prevailing in the first, 
while support to private outcomes in the second [13]. According to Hayek [14], the two cultures imply 
two different conceptions of freedom: a freedom “from” and “of” for the common law, against a 
freedom “for” in the civil law, where social goals inspire the system of law and regulation. Using 
Djankov et al.’s [15] expression, in the dilemma between addressing market failure with regulation 
and avoiding state abuse, civil law is more oriented toward the former and common law toward the 
latter. This explains why civil law is “policy implementing”, while common law is “dispute 
resolving” [16].  
La Porta et al. [12,17] also showed that the two different cultures produce significant disparities 
in terms of rules and economic outcomes. Common law countries generally have higher shareholder 
and creditor protection and more capitalized stock exchanges than civil law countries. The latter are 
also shown to have higher government ownership and regulation than the former, which are 
characterized in turn by greater independence of the judicial power with better contract enforcement 
as well as security of property rights.  
However, the study by La Porta et al. [12] has been criticized for lacking a proper theoretical 
channel through which the common law tradition provides more protection to non-controlling 
shareholders against insiders [18]. Moreover, Rajan and Zingales [19] and Lamoreux et al. [20] 
provided historical evidence on the relative development of capital markets in civil/common law 
countries with specific reference to the France-UK comparison. As a partial answer to the above 
critiques, Beck et al. [21] identified two patterns which de facto explain the observed correlation 
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between common law and shareholder protection. The first is the priority given to the right of the 
individual vis-à-vis the state. The second is the higher flexibility with respect to more rigid financial 
traditions in reducing the gap between needs of the economy and legal system capability to foster 
financial development. These two patterns may actually reconcile the perspective of La Porta et al. 
[12] and the empirical evidence accounting for both the higher correlation between common law and 
shareholder protection today and historical phases in which some civil law countries such as France 
may have performed relatively better in terms of financial market development.  
Also the international management literature has investigated the relationships between 
institutional features and CSR. Matten and Moon [22] and Aguilera et al. [23] pioneered theoretical 
frameworks to explain differences in CSR across countries. In the same spirit of La Porta et al. [12], 
the former argued that these differences can be due to historically different institutional frameworks 
that shaped “national business systems” [24]—common law countries tend to favor “explicit” CSR 
policies, while civil law countries would foster “implicit” CSR ones. The first case refers to companies 
that explicitly and voluntarily implement CSR policies, whereas in the second case CSR is embedded 
in the national formal and informal institutions under the form of “[…] values, norms, and rules that 
result in (mandatory and customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues 
and that define proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms […]” 
(Matten and Moon [22] p. 409).  
According to Aguilera et al. [23], since corporations are embedded in different national business 
systems, they face different internal and external pressures to implement CSR policies. In particular, 
they argued that shareholders in the Anglo-American model would support CSR activities, leading 
to short-term benefits, whereas shareholders in Continental Europe would focus on long-term 
benefits for a larger set of stakeholders. Institutional features specific to the two national systems 
would explain the differences in CSR policies between the two models—e.g., dispersed ownership 
focusing on short-term returns within the Anglo-American model versus long-term debt finance and 
ownership of large shareholders within the European model. 
The aim of our paper is to give a contribution to this literature by investigating the nexus 
between legal origins and CSR [13] in order to understand: i) why some companies engage more in 
CSR and why others do not; ii) whether this is due to cultural factors and, more specifically, legal 
origins; iii) what consequences the different emphasis on specific CSR domains have on the corporate 
strategy and wellbeing of different stakeholders, i.e., workers, local communities (through stronger 
emphasis on environmental sustainability), and shareholders (with stronger emphasis on corporate 
governance). In terms of policy implications, our research offers important insights on the extent to 
which the CSR stance affects the way societies deal with externalities and/or provide public goods, 
and on whether the latter are addressed/provided more by regulation or governmental action as 
opposed to voluntary corporate action.  
Consistent with the aforementioned theoretical framework, we formulate hypotheses on how 
different institutional features rooted in different legal origins translate into different CSR domains, 
and test them econometrically. More specifically, since common law countries tend to have higher 
corporate discretion and disclosure of information, more efficient financial markets and higher 
transparency and accountability than civil law ones, they are traditionally more oriented at protecting 
shareholders’ interests and therefore might score higher in the corporate governance domain. 
Moreover, we also hypothesize that common law countries have higher CSR scores in the community 
involvement domain, because of the “two-step” Anglo-Saxon culture—whereby charitable 
contributions are accepted after satisfying profit maximization—and the higher philanthropy 
capacity. Finally, we expect higher CSR scores of civil law countries in the labor domain (Human 
Resources), as those countries enjoy a more generous legislation in favor of workers and less 
shareholder (more stakeholder) protection than common law ones. We also document the unexpected 
finding of a lack of observable differences in the environmental domain, which we attribute to a 
progressive convergence from different legal systems to industry-sustainability standards, which are 
increasingly being adopted worldwide.  
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The paper is divided into six sections. In the second and third we formulate our theoretical 
hypotheses by analyzing how and whether a given legal tradition may be expected to be more 
favorable to compliance toward a given CSR domain. In the fourth we present our data. In the fifth 
we illustrate our descriptive and econometric findings. The sixth section concludes. 
2. Legal Origin Culture and Stakeholder Rights 
The classic view of the legal purpose of the corporation originated in common law countries—
shareholder primacy—seems to leave almost no room for that part of corporate social responsibility 
intended as a departure from profit maximization toward the satisfaction of a broader range of 
stakeholders [25–28]. According to this view, the manager receives a mandate from their employees 
(the shareholders) to maximize the profits of the company in the respect of the law. In this 
perspective, CSR entails the risk that the manager abuses of their own power to perform actions that 
waste corporate cash flow and are directed to increase their prestige beyond the screen of promoting 
the wellbeing of the other corporate stakeholders.  
A view that is quite similar in its consequences to that of shareholder primacy defines the 
company as a nexus of contracts between suppliers and various production factors [29,30]. These 
contracts ensure that factors of production receive a fixed payment in exchange for their services, 
while shareholders are residual claimants of all the remaining cash flow. Similar to the shareholder 
primacy view, the nexus of contracts view regards any reduction of the shareholder residual as 
something that is unfairly subtracted from their pockets. The legitimacy of the shareholder claim on 
the residual cash flow is generally based on the idea that shareholders are those who bear most of the 
risk in the corporate venture, since their remuneration is more volatile than the fixed payment due to 
workers.  
A third novel view of the legal purpose of the corporation was developed by Blair and Stout 
[31]. By criticizing this last point, the authors placed emphasis on the fact that resources invested by 
shareholders (money) are much more diversifiable than those invested by suppliers and workers 
(their skills and human capital) in the venture. As a matter of fact, in case of corporate failure, a 
shareholder with a well-diversified portfolio of financial assets may suffer fewer negative 
consequences than middle-aged low-skilled workers who invested all in job skills which may have 
become obsolete after corporate failure. This is one of the reasons why Blair and Stout [31] defined 
the company as a team, finding it therefore reasonable that the company uses the value added it 
produces to remunerate stakeholders in proportion to their merit and contribution. This third view 
is obviously much more favorable to non-shareholder-oriented CSR domains than the previous two.  
Reinhardt’s [32] conclusion on the US view of the legal purpose of the company is that the first 
two approaches (shareholder primacy and firm as a nexus of contracts) remain prevalent. What is, 
however, noted is that a “two-step” approach to CSR, where many states recognize the right of 
businesses to make charitable contributions after satisfying profit maximization, is quite popular in 
the US and, more in general, in Anglo-Saxon countries. This tradition of corporate philanthropy 
traces back to the well-known examples of Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and Henry Ford, 
among others. Nevertheless, a weakness of the shareholder primacy tenet in the US is that courts are 
generally quite indulgent toward managerial behavior. This is because they admit that it is difficult 
to bridge the informational asymmetry toward managers to establish “second guesses” beyond their 
actions that were not directed to the benefit of corporate profits. Last, but not least, many US 
jurisdictions have adopted “non-shareholder constituency statutes”, which mitigate the shareholder 
primacy principle [33]. 
In conclusion, in spite of the prevalence of the first two views, which are quite hostile to non-
shareholder-oriented CSR, the “two-step” tradition of corporate philanthropy and the indulgence of 
tribunals lead us to expect a development of CSR in the US (and more in general in Anglo-Saxon 
countries) also beyond traditional corporate governance rules protecting shareholders, and especially 
in the direction of monetary donations to local communities.  
On the opposite side, it is reasonable to expect that attitudes toward CSR in civil law countries 
reflect characteristics described in the legal origin theory—generally lower shareholder protection 
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and a cultural milieu in which economic activity must be oriented toward social goals (which 
mitigates shareholders’ interest and aim to increase the wellbeing of other stakeholders). In this sense, 
civil law countries have developed a tradition that is much closer to Blair and Stout’s [31] idea of the 
corporation as a team, whereby the added value generated by the creativity of corporate activities 
must be redistributed across different shareholders, with the board of directors balancing the 
competing demands of team members (stakeholders). This view is supported by Roe [34], who 
argued that in countries such as Germany and France stakeholders (and in particular, employees) 
have much stronger legal power than in the United States. This different attitude may be fostered 
also by differences in shareholders’ ownership, whereby a few large shareholders may be more likely 
(and have more power) to commit socially than the dispersed shareholders of US companies.  
3. Our Research Hypotheses 
The main question we aim to answer in this paper is which CSR domains are correlated with 
civil and which with common law, or, more broadly, with the four families of legal origins (Anglo-
Saxon, French, Scandinavian, and German). Based on the literature surveyed above we expect the 
following: 
i) Common law countries have higher CSR scores in the corporate governance domain (which is 
traditionally oriented to promote shareholders’ wellbeing); 
ii) Common law countries have higher CSR scores in the community involvement domain; 
iii) Civil law countries (and, more specifically, the French tradition) have higher scores in the CSR 
labor domain (human resources).  
As should be clear from what was discussed in the previous sections, these three hypotheses 
stem from the characteristics outlined by the legal origin literature when applied to a relatively novel 
investigation field such as that of CSR.  
In particular, hypothesis i) is supported by the idea that common law countries are characterized 
by higher corporate discretion and disclosure of information [12,17,35], as well as an efficient financial 
source based on a central stock market [22], with low shareholder dispersion leading to higher 
transparency and accountability [36–38]. Conversely, in civil law countries—characterized by 
concentrated ownership, underdeveloped financial markets, and low transparency and 
accountability [22]—stakeholders other than shareholders also play a role that sometimes is even 
more important than that of shareholders [39]. 
Hypothesis ii) is derived from the aforementioned two-step culture of profit maximization, 
followed by philanthropic donations typical of the Anglo-Saxon culture, as well as from the “explicit” 
CSR type of common-law countries, which enjoy a relative capacity for philanthropy [40], as 
theorized by Matten and Moon [22]. 
The third hypothesis is based on the cultural traditions of civil law countries, where laws in favor 
of workers are higher and shareholder protection lower. Coordinated market economies stimulate 
employee cooperation and the development of collective agreements in wage determination [41] and 
[24]. Moreover, in countries with a large role for government in the economy, distributional outcomes 
play an important role and tend to favor employees over capital-owners in case of conflict between 
the two [34]. CSR activities concerning human resources in civil law countries are more likely to be 
“implicit”, since employee representation and participation are protected by an intensive 
employment regulation [22]. 
An important issue related to our hypotheses arises when we consider one of the most common 
CSR definitions, which relies on the integration of social and environmental concerns on a voluntary 
basis. We clarify here that what we measure with standard CSR rating agencies data (i.e., those by 
VIGEO) is a sort of gross CSR—that is, the total corporate engagement in a given domain, which may 
include legal standards required by a given country plus the net CSR component generated by 
corporate voluntary conduct. In this sense legal origins are expected to influence both components, 
since they affect not only legal rules but also culture, which may in turn impact corporate voluntary 
choices. 
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4. Data  
Our sample period was from 2003 to 2013 and included 1834 unique companies. The dataset was 
created by merging five different sources: (i) data on CSR scores at company level from the VIGEO 
world dataset; (ii) stock prices from DATASTREAM; (iii) information on legal origins taken from La 
Porta et al. (2008); (iv) industry specification from Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC); and 
(v) controls at firm level from COMPUSTAT Global. 
The firms included in the VIGEO world dataset were chosen amongst the components of the 
STOXX Global 1800 Index, with a preference for companies that were in the MSCI World as well. The 
VIGEO dataset covers 95.3% (65%) of the STOXX Global 1800 Index in terms of market capitalization 
(number of companies). Other companies were included if they were components of specific national 
indices (i.e., S&P/MIB for Italy). The STOXX Global 1800 Index provides a broad investable 
representation of the world’s developed markets of Europe, North America, and Asia/Pacific. This 
Index contains 600 European, 600 American, and 600 Asia/Pacific region stocks represented by the 
STOXX Europe 600 Index, the STOXX North America 600 Index, and the STOXX Asia/Pacific 600 
Index. Stocks were selected based on their rankings by free float market capitalization. Instead of 
using all the outstanding shares as in the full-market capitalization method, the free-float method 
excluded locked-in shares such as those held by promoters and governments. The number of 
companies in our dataset was higher than 1800 due to new entries in the STOXX global index during 
our sampling period. 
VIGEO assesses CSR performance on six domains: human resources, environment, business 
behavior, corporate governance, community involvement, and human rights. Each domain is divided 
into a different number of drivers 𝑘, for a total of 38 drivers over six domains. According to industry 
𝑗 in which firm 𝑖 belongs, drivers can be activated or not. Details on each domain and sustainability 
driver are provided in Appendix B.  
The score for each domain 𝑑—𝐹𝑆ௗሺ𝑖𝑗ሻ—for firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 is computed as follows: 
𝐹𝑆ௗሺ𝑖𝑗ሻ =  ∑ ௡೔ೕ೏ೖ௪೔ೕ೏ೖೖ಼సభ ௐೕ೏ , (1) 
where 𝑛௜௝ௗ௞ is the score assigned in the driver 𝑘 to the firm 𝑖 belonging to the industry 𝑗, which 
goes from 0 to 100; 𝑤௜௝ௗ௞ is the weight (going from 1 to 3) assigned in the driver 𝑘 to the firm 𝑖 
belonging to the industry 𝑗 ; 𝑊௝ௗ is the sum of all the categories’ weights activated in the domain 
(𝑊௝ௗ = ∑ 𝑤௜௝ௗ௞௄௞ୀଵ ).  
The value assigned depends from the difficulty in implementing CSR standards in each specific 
category than it is industry specific. If 𝑤௜௝ௗ௞  = 1, for the industry 𝑗 it’s relatively easy to implement 
CSR standards in the category under analysis; vice versa for the case 𝑤௜௝ௗ௞ = 3. For example, the 
values taken by 𝑤௜௝ௗ௞  tend to be low for a bank in the environmental domains, since respect of 
environmental standards is relatively easier for this industry. Note that 𝑛௜௝ௗ௞ = 0 indicates the lack 
of transparency of the firm in the category under consideration or the simultaneous presence of 
litigations; the opposite occurs in the case of 𝑛௜௝ௗ௞ = 100.    
The weighted sum across all the domains is defined as the overall score for firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 
—𝑂𝐴௜௝—as follows: 
𝑂𝐴ሺ𝑖𝑗ሻ  =  ∑ ிௌ೏ሺ௜௝ሻ ௐೕ೏ವ೏సభ ௐೕ , (2) 
where 𝑊௝ is the sum of all the categories’ weights activated in all the six domains ( 𝑊௝ =
∑ ∑ 𝑤௜௝ௗ௞௄௞ୀଵ஽ௗୀଵ ). 
Equation (1) measures the scores across 𝑘 drivers in a specific domain 𝑑, while Equation (2) 
measures across 𝑘 categories over all the six domains considered.  
In order to control for the robustness of our results to the VIGEO weighting approach, we 
introduced fixed industry effects as regressors in our econometric estimates and, alternatively, we 
calculated scores as deviations from industry averages in the empirical analysis presented in the next 
sections. 
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5. Descriptive Statistics  
Strictly following La Porta et al.’s [22] classification, we divided the firms in our sample 
according to the legal origins of their country; more specifically, we classify them in four categories, 
namely French, German, Scandinavian, or English legal origin. Firms in countries belonging to the 
first three categories were also grouped into the broader civil law category, while those belonging the 
fourth were grouped into the common law category (see Table 1 for country allocation to the different 
families). 
Table 1. Classification of countries by legal origins. 
COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW 
English French Scandinavian German 
Australia, Canada, Hong-Kong, Ireland, 
New Zealand 
Belgium, France, Portugal 
Denmark, 
Finland,  
Austria, Bermuda, China, 
Luxembourg 
Singapore, United Kingdom, United 
States 




Germany, Iceland, Japan, 
Switzerland 
In Table 2 we report summary statistics for all the variables used in descriptive and econometric 
analysis. Civil and common law groups were almost balanced (52 against 48 percent), while the 
French and the German families were much larger within the civil law origin (each of them 
accounting for 23 percent of the overall sample against 7 percent of the Scandinavian family).  
In order to have descriptive evidence to test our hypotheses, we provide in Table 3 a breakdown 
of CSR criteria by legal origins. More specifically, when we considered simple CSR means, firms in 
civil law countries displayed higher CSR scores than those in common law countries under all criteria 
but corporate governance (all the differences were significant under parametric tests). Non 
parametric tests provide results which are not qualitatively different (available upon request).  
The higher performance of civil law countries seems to be driven by countries with French legal 
origins, which enjoy higher CSR scores in all criteria relative to those with English legal origins, with 
the only exception being the corporate governance criterion, under which the latter performed better 
than the former.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean  Std. Dev.  (95% Conf. Interval) Min Max 
CSR score 
Overall score 7000 36.064 12.301 35.378 36.751 4 77 
Human resources 8137 28.990 17.646 28.029 29.951 0 84 
Environment 8137 31.352 18.381 30.357 32.348 0 87 
Business behaviour 8137 38.892 13.275 38.281 39.504 4 82 
Corporate governance 8137 46.239 17.078 45.392 47.087 1 94 
Community involvement 8137 36.064 18.547 35.086 37.041 0 96 
Human rights 7000 39.391 14.422 38.619 40.163 3 91 
Legal origin 
Civil law 8135 0.520 0.495 0.491 0.548 0 1 
English  8137 0.480 0.495 0.452 0.509 0 1 
French 8137 0.229 0.453 0.203 0.255 0 1 
German 8137 0.225 0.411 0.201 0.248 0 1 
Scandinavian 8137 0.066 0.247 0.053 0.080 0 1 
Other variables 
Total Assets (ln) 7749 0.076 0.632 0.044 0.108 0 21.834 
GDP per capita PPP 
(Purchasing Power Parity)/1000 
8135 38.857 8.095 38.451 39.263 6.781 81.104 
G/GDP 8135 43.782 7.048 43.391 44.173 14.432 64.902 
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Table 3. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by legal origins. 















ENGLISH 35.794 24.554 29.842 39.150 55.757 36.996 37.298 
 (10.989) (14.282) (17.874) (12.663) (13.002) (18.398) (12.625) 
FRENCH 40.097 43.340 39.334 44.560 43.557 44.566 44.625 
 (12.856) (16.052) (17.369) (13.396) (13.819) (17.556) (15.326) 
SCANDINAVIAN 36.845 35.269 34.771 40.741 44.399 32.718 42.855 
 (11.229) (15.959) (18.285) (13.167) (12.381) (17.689) (14.847) 
GERMAN 32.120 30.363 34.356 38.013 32.581 33.266 37.501 
 (13.320) (18.088) (18.757) (13.156) (18.324) (17.953) (15.362) 
COMMON LAW 35.800 24.555 29.849 39.162 55.763 36.998 37.303 
 (10.989) (14.284) (17.877) (12.656) (13.002) (18.395) (12.624) 
CIVIL LAW 36.239 37.494 36.923 41.639 39.495 38.922 41.327 
 (13.387) (17.908) (18.173) (13.625) (16.451) (18.618) (15.644) 
B) Test of mean CSR score by legal origin (t-statistics) 
Common versus 
Civil Law 
–3.9544 *** –15.7723 *** –6.9578 *** –5.7715 *** 17.3054 *** –2.1211 *** –8.9743 *** 
English versus 
French  
–4.9787 *** –17.3151 *** –7.2738 *** –6.8656 *** 15.2730 *** –6.2778 *** –8.3713 *** 
English versus 
German  
–1.3065 * –9.7134 *** –5.4665 *** –2.664 0*** 15.4367 *** 0.8974 –6.0205 *** 
English versus 
Scandinavian  
–2.6224 *** –10.1105 *** –3.4363 *** –3.5419 *** 9.7071 *** 3.2803 *** –7.7834 *** 
French versus 
German  
3.2572 *** 5.5955 *** 0.6951 3.7528 *** 3.0236 *** 6.9431 *** 1.5557 * 
French versus 
Scandinavian  
1.6488 ** 3.9014 *** 2.4252 *** 2.0189 *** –2.8465 *** 8.7892 *** –0.8435 
German versus 
Scandinavian  
1.3130 * 1.0514 –1.5323 * 1.1957 4.9836 *** –2.4288 *** 2.0718 ** 
Std. dev. are reported in parentheses; * Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** 
Significant at the 10% level. 
This preliminary statistical testing was oriented toward the non-rejection of our hypotheses i) 
and iii), since common law countries exhibited better CSR performance in the corporate governance 
domain, whereas civil law countries in the human resources and human rights domains. Evidence 
on hypothesis ii) was instead contrary to what we expected. 
However, the comparison of CSR means can be misleading if we do not consider the potential 
source of heterogeneity coming from industry-specific characteristics (which the VIGEO’s weighting 
approach described above tries to address). To control for this, we calculated in each period and 
domain deviations of firm CSR scores from the average of the industry it belongs to (i.e., 𝐹𝑆ௗሺ𝑖𝑗ሻ − ∑ 𝐹𝑆ௗ(𝑖𝑗)௝ ). The effect of industry-specific characteristics was further controlled for in econometric 
estimates, where dummies for industry were included among regressors. The descriptive analysis of 
industry deviation scores differs from the previously described patterns (Table 4). In particular, for 
the overall CSR score, civil law countries were, on average, below the mean industry overall CSR 
score.  
This finding might appear in principle inconsistent with the high overall CSR-performance of 
civil law countries reported in Table 3. The combination of the two results suggests that civil law 
countries have a higher number of firms in CSR-friendly sectors than common law countries. The 
difference between the two results, instead, confirms the importance of industry characteristics, 
which we consider in the econometric estimates below.  
However, and consistently with the previous results, civil law countries performed better (i.e., 
were above the industry average) under the human rights and human resources criteria, whereas the 
common law ones were in general above the industry average in all the other domains (most 
differences were significant in parametric tests).  
This last piece of evidence gives additional support to our hypotheses i) and iii) and leads us 
also to not have any more mixed findings on hypothesis ii), since common law countries exhibited 
Sustainability 2020, 12, 2717 9 of 30 
higher CSR performance also in the community involvement domain after netting out industry-
specific characteristics (i.e., are above the industry CSR average in that domain).  
Table 4. Deviations from industry average CSR by legal origins. 















ENGLISH 1.095 –0.895 0.459 0.283 5.869 1.221 –0.225 
 (8.317) (9.756) (13.344) (9.811) (12.026) (13.776) (9.685) 
FRENCH –0.007 2.056 –0.622 0.294 –3.879 0.692 0.986 
 (10.152) (12.673) (13.076) (10.207) (12.303) (14.332) (12.523) 
SCANDINAVIAN –2.215 –1.206 –1.316 –0.808 –4.033 –5.945 0.156 
 (9.766) (12.728) (14.113) (11.138) (11.360) (15.152) (12.741) 
GERMAN –1.650 –0.587 0.311 –0.714 –5.351 –1.566 –0.575 
 (9.206) (11.625) (13.744) (9.547) (11.572) (12.520) (11.230) 
COMMON LAW 1.100 –0.894 0.468 0.295 5.863 1.224 –0.220 
 (8.316) (9.755) (13.342) (9.801) (12.027) (13.777) (9.684) 
CIVIL LAW –1.002 0.679 –0.348 –0.215 –4.454 –0.927 0.206 
 (9.744) (12.371) (13.463) (10.087) (11.943) (13.930) (12.032) 
B) Test of mean deviations from industry average CSR by legal origin (t-statistics) 
Common versus Civil Law 3.9577 *** –4.2117 *** –0.4823 –0.2473 20.2065 *** 3.4607 *** –1.9829 ** 
English versus French  2.5585 *** –4.9788 *** –0.2827 –0.8787 18.0384 *** 0.4510 –1.7040 ** 
English versus German  4.0470 *** –2.2191 ** –1.0706 0.3612 15.8392 *** 3.8860 *** –0.9515 
English versus Scandinavian  3.4012 *** –2.4585 *** –0.2366 –0.3054 11.9200 *** 6.6926 *** –2.7290 *** 
French versus German  1.4541 * 2.5351 *** –0.8375 1.1751 –0.7165 3.2695 *** 0.7045 
French versus Scandinavian  1.1658 1.5031 * –0.0149 0.3781 –2.7185 *** 6.3368 *** –1.1678 
German versus Scandinavian 0.1050 0.6110 –0.6567 0.5695 2.1098 * –3.5324 *** 1.7726 ** 
Std. dev. are reported in parentheses; * Significant at the 1 % level; ** Significant at the 5 % level; *** 
Significant at the 10 % level. 
Last but not least, in order to analyze how corporate social responsibility has changed across the 
years, we display in Figure 1 (panels a–g) the time dynamics of average CSR scores. These figures 
reveal marked convergence pattern across different legal origin areas in the overall CSR score and 
particularly in the environment domain, where the two groups converged to a mean sample value 
(Figure 1, panel c). This descriptive evidence induced us to test econometrically the convergence 

















Figure 1. Deviations from industry average CSR over time. 
5.1. Econometric Model and Results  
The descriptive statistics and parametric tests presented so far did not take into account the panel 
structure of our dataset and did not allow us to isolate the impact of legal origin from other time, 
industry, and country specific characteristics that are also expected to influence CSR scores. 
Moreover, even though we have no reason to doubt that the VIGEO’s weighting system reflects an 
expert intervention on a scoring process, which is in any case subjective and arbitrary also before the 
weighting intervention, we were interested in checking whether our main results were robust to a 
weakening of such weighting effect. For these reasons, we ran an econometric analysis using a 
standard linear random effects model. This model made it possible to estimate the effects of legal 
origin on CSR scores by exploiting both within (over time) and between (across firms) variation in 
the sample. An advantage of random effects models is that they allow us to include (and estimate the 
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effect of) time invariant variables, among which is our key regressor of interest, i.e., legal origin. In 
the fixed effects model these time-invariant variables are absorbed by the intercept. 
The baseline model we estimated was the following: 
CSR௜௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽 Legal_Origins௜ + 𝛾ଵln(Total_Assets)௜௧ + 𝛾ଶGDP௜௧ +
𝛾ଷG/GDP௜௧ + ∑𝛿௝𝐷year௝ + ∑𝜔௞𝐷industry௞ + ∑𝜁௟X௟௧  +ν௜+ 𝜀௜௧, (3) 
where for firm i at time t the dependent variable 𝐶𝑆𝑅 was, in some specifications, the overall or the 
domain-specific CSR score while, in alternative ones, was the firm i’s deviation from the industry-
average (overall or domain-specific) CSR score calculated at time t. 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑠 was our main 
variable of interest which, according to the implemented specification, took the form of a (0/1) 
dummy for countries belonging to the civil law group (variable Civil Law) or, alternatively, of a set of 
(0/1) dummies for countries belonging to the French, Scandinavian, German, and English legal origin 
groups (variables French, Scandinavian, German, and English), with the latter used as omitted 
benchmark. Among controls, ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) is the natural logarithm of the value of assets in US$ 
owned by firm i at time t and is a proxy for firm size, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 and 𝐺/𝐺𝐷𝑃 are, respectively, the country 
per capita GDP in US$PPP and the country government expenditure (total expense and the net 
acquisition of nonfinancial assets) as percentage of GDP for firm i at time t (GDP has been scaled by 
1000); 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 and 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 are, respectively, dummy variables for each year with no missing 
observations in all the CSR criteria (2003 is the omitted benchmark) and dummies for the industry 
firm i belongs to (the aerospace industry is the omitted category). In alternative specifications we also 
introduced a set of additional X controls at firm, industry, and country level which will be discussed 
in detail in Section 5.2 (Robustness checks). Finally, 𝜀௜௧ is an idiosyncratic error, while ν௜ captures a 
firm’s time invariant characteristics. In all estimates, errors were clustered at country level to account 
for correlation of ν௜ within countries. 
In Tables 5,6 we report estimated findings for determinants of the overall CSR and of all CSR 
domains using the Civil Law dummy (Table 5) or the French, Scandinavian, German dummies (Table 6) 
as legal origin variables. The first specification confirmed previous descriptive findings, since 
common law countries performed better in the overall CSR score than civil law countries (Table 5, 
column 1). When considering the specific domains, the same holds true for community involvement 
and corporate governance (Table 5, columns 5 and 6). When considering the legal origin dummies, 
we found that the French legal origin was associated with higher CSR scores in the human resources 
domain than the English legal origin (Table 6, column 2), whereas the latter outperformed under the 
corporate governance and community involvement criteria (Table 6, columns 5 and 6). In terms of 
economic significance, the common law effect on corporate governance is remarkable (1.49 times the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable) and much stronger than the effect of the same legal 
origin group on community involvement (0.37 percent of the standard deviation) and the French law 
effect on human resources (0.37 percent of the standard deviation). Looking at the impact of our 
controls, we did not find evidence of substitutability between public welfare and corporate social 
responsibility (no evidence of negative and significant effect, while in very few cases a positive and 
significant effect).  
Table 5. Determinants of CSR over time: random effects. 















ln(Total Assets) –0.0163 –0.0122 0.0768 0.0129 –0.0310 0.0947 0.000988 
 (0.0548) (0.0661) (0.105) (0.0556) (0.0931) (0.126) (0.0680) 
Civil Law –5.837 *** 1.417 –2.372 –2.131 * –25.36 *** –6.922 *** –1.061 
 (1.378) (1.816) (1.882) (1.174) (2.818) (1.500) (1.069) 
GDP 0.0213 0.0305 –0.166 0.00896 0.168 –0.0515 0.0538 
 (0.0900) (0.0983) (0.104) (0.0764) (0.146) (0.110) (0.0840) 
G/GDP 0.174 ** 0.183 0.0875 0.129 0.173 0.301 * 0.257 ** 
 (0.0848) (0.154) (0.108) (0.0877) (0.134) (0.156) (0.104) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year). 
Table 6. Determinants of CSR over time: random effects. 













ln(Total Assets) –0.00702 0.0111 0.0769 0.0204 –0.0205 0.0994 0.00765 
 (0.0582) (0.0621) (0.109) (0.0573) (0.0901) (0.137) (0.0674) 
French Origins –3.701 * 6.595 ** –2.048 –0.254 –23.50 *** –4.299 * 0.511 
 (2.113) (2.754) (3.062) (1.863) (3.032) (2.408) (1.947) 
Scandinavian Origins –6.704 ** –0.381 –3.614 –2.829 –23.42 *** –14.24 *** –1.362 
 (2.631) (2.682) (3.305) (2.373) (3.839) (2.678) (2.719) 
German Origins –7.015 *** –1.399 –2.303 –3.108 ** –26.87 *** –7.034 *** –1.942 * 
 (1.301) (1.730) (1.859) (1.236) (3.086) (1.201) (1.125) 
GDP 0.0336 0.0586 –0.150 0.0193 0.141 0.0565 0.0584 
 (0.0924) (0.108) (0.107) (0.0791) (0.146) (0.114) (0.0852) 
G/GDP 0.154 * 0.125 0.0956 0.105 0.119 0.348 ** 0.234 ** 
 (0.0793) (0.115) (0.108) (0.0848) (0.132) (0.146) (0.0927) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year); English Origins. 
In order to net out the effect of industry specific weights, we evaluated the robustness of the 
previous findings with the alternative approach of considering as the dependent variable deviations 
of CSR scores from industry averages for each company and CSR criterion. Regression results were 
again consistent with descriptive evidence (Tables 7,8), with common (civil) law firms above (below) 
their industry average when considering the overall score and the corporate governance and 
community involvement domains (Table 7, columns 5 and 6). In these estimates, firms belonging to 
the French legal origin family were more likely to be above their industry average score in the human 
resources domain (Table 8, column 2) than those in the English family. On the contrary, the latter 
tended to outperform all the other legal origin groups in the corporate governance and community 
involvement domains, as well as when considering the overall CSR score (Table 8, columns 5 and 6). 
Results are robust to the exclusion of industry dummies (see Tables A1,A2 in Appendix A).   
Table 7. Determinants of deviations from industry average CSR over time: random effects. 











Involvement Human Rights 
ln(Total Assets) 0.0123 0.0307 0.0170 0.0637 0.0259 0.0664 0.0127 
 (0.0480) (0.0689) (0.0932) (0.0493) (0.0795) (0.108) (0.0558) 
Civil Law –5.335 *** 1.107 –2.768 * –1.769 –22.57 *** –5.741 *** –0.986 
 (1.250) (1.556) (1.534) (1.085) (2.870) (1.094) (0.969) 
GDP –0.0310 0.0156 –0.152 * 0.0102 0.0939 –0.164 * 0.0162 
 (0.0832) (0.0925) (0.0910) (0.0821) (0.136) (0.0930) (0.0737) 
G/GDP 0.118 0.165 0.163 * 0.106 0.0636 0.107 0.211 ** 
 (0.0866) (0.146) (0.0901) (0.0818) (0.114) (0.114) (0.0906) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
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Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year). 
Table 8. Determinants of deviations from industry average CSR over time: random effects.  















ln(Total Assets) 0.0207 0.0487 0.0152 0.0695 0.0372 0.0720 0.0194 
 (0.0494) (0.0609) (0.0951) (0.0494) (0.0784) (0.117) (0.0549) 
French Origins –3.445 * 5.436 ** –2.843 –0.227 –20.46 *** –3.378 * 0.484 
 (1.880) (2.363) (2.562) (1.652) (2.755) (1.934) (1.694) 
Scandinavian Origins –5.753 ** –0.333 –4.109 –2.578 –20.33 *** –11.16 *** –0.566 
 (2.266) (2.485) (2.868) (2.154) (3.272) (1.959) (2.353) 
German Origins –6.408 *** –1.199 –2.442 * –2.522 ** –24.23 *** –6.100 *** –1.927 ** 
 (1.193) (1.492) (1.429) (1.131) (3.216) (0.891) (0.971) 
GDP –0.0244 0.0383 –0.133 0.0221 0.0611 –0.0810 0.0100 
 (0.0842) (0.0953) (0.0970) (0.0829) (0.132) (0.0846) (0.0726) 
G/GDP 0.0935 0.110 0.180** 0.0894 –0.00394 0.137 0.178** 
 (0.0763) (0.112) (0.0907) (0.0773) (0.106) (0.0902) (0.0803) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year); English Origins. 
We repeated our estimates for any single sustainability variable in order to verify which of them 
was driving the aggregate domain results (see Table A5 in Appendix A). What we observed here is 
that the superior performance of the civil law origin was significant for all items for which we had a 
sufficient number of observations in the corporate governance and community involvement 
domains. Results were mixed in the human rights domain (where the civil law origin significantly 
outperformed in the promotion of labor relations and encouraging employee participation 
sustainability drivers, while it significantly underperformed in the improvement of health and safety 
conditions and respect and management of working hours sustainability drivers) and in the human 
resources domain (where the civil law origin significantly outperformed in the respect for freedom 
of association and right to collective bargaining and non-discrimination sustainability drivers). Note, 
however, that when looking at the performance of families within the two legal origin groups, the 
French family outperformed in six of the human resources sustainability drivers (promotion of labor 
relations, encouraging employee participation, training and development, responsible management 
and restructurings, career management, and promotion of employability), thereby confirming our 
previous findings on this point. 
Statistical tests and regressions highlighted lack of a statistically significant impact of legal 
origins on CSR scores regarding the environment criteria, both in aggregate domains (column 3 in 
Tables 5–8) and in the sustainability driver estimates (Table A5 in Appendix A), with the exception 
of the management of atmospheric emissions. A plausible explanation for this hinges on CSR 
convergence between firms in civil and common law countries in those specific domains, 
convergence which we already envisaged in the inspection of CSR score time dynamics (Figure 1). 
This finding is consistent with Meyer’s [42] prediction that regulatory processes would generate more 
standardized and rationalized concerns on environmental issues. More specifically, Meyer [42] 
argued that similarities in terms of environmental concerns in Western countries may be a rationale 
for convergence in CSR policies on environment, However, this may not be the case for CSR activities 
related to labor issues as labor markets, are still deregulated across liberal market economies. Our 
evidence on the lack of CSR convergence between civil and common law countries in terms of human 
resources confirms the latter prediction. 
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In order to test for convergence in the last ten-year sample period, we averaged each domain-
specific CSR score over five main periods (2003–2005, 2006–2007, 2008–2009, 2010–2011, 2012–2013), 
constructed for each domain the growth rate of CSR between the first and the last period, and 
regressed it on the same controls as in Equation (3), also adding the level of CSR score for the relevant 
domain in the first period (2003–2005). CSR growth rate is calculated as ஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబభమషభయି஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబబయషబఱ஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబబయషబఱ . A 
negative and significant coefficient of the first-period level would support the convergence 
hypothesis. 
Results from Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regressions are reported in Tables 9,10 and confirm 
the convergence hypothesis, since the coefficient of the first-period level variable (Score Level 03–05) 
was negative and significant for all CSR domains—hence indicating a general convergence for all 
criteria—while the coefficients of the legal origin variables were not (or weakly) significant just for 
the business behavior and environment domains (Tables 8,9, columns 3 and 4). Note that the presence 
of significant convergence effects also in the other CSR domains does not contradict descriptive 
evidence in Figure 1. What is probably at work is a convergence process which is mostly within, but 
not between, legal origin groups in these cases. This justifies both convergence and significant 
coefficients of the legal origin dummies. Evidence of within legal group convergence is omitted for 
reasons of space and is available from the authors upon request. 
Table 9. CSR convergence between civil and common law countries. 















ln(Total Assets) −0.00508 0.00206 0.0168 −0.00574 −0.0121 * 0.0583 0.000891 
 (0.00539) (0.00786) (0.0294) (0.00704) (0.00690) (0.0461) (0.00589) 
Civil Law 0.0513 0.236 *** −0.0781 0.0891 * −0.472 *** 0.221 * 0.179 *** 
 (0.0399) (0.0293) (0.193) (0.0454) (0.108) (0.119) (0.0342) 
GDP −0.00116 0.000704 0.00906 −0.00543 −0.00173 −0.00872 −0.00592 * 
 (0.00443) (0.00391) (0.0121) (0.00351) (0.00843) (0.00755) (0.00284) 
G/GDP 0.00260 0.00863 ** 0.00227 −0.00422 9.64e−05 −0.0311 * −0.00124 
 (0.00261) (0.00326) (0.00730) (0.00289) (0.00497) (0.0153) (0.00197) 
Score Level (03–05) −0.0267 *** −0.0208 *** −0.0443 *** −0.0262 *** −0.0297 *** −0.0359 *** −0.0165 *** 
 (0.00136) (0.00265) (0.00711) (0.00384) (0.00737) (0.0118) (0.000905) 
Dummy 2006–2007 0.0606 * 0.0142 −0.165 −0.00817 −0.0471 −0.144 0.0865 ** 
 (0.0314) (0.0293) (0.211) (0.0315) (0.0348) (0.166) (0.0315) 
Dummy 2008–2009 0.0411 −0.0227 −0.199 0.00918 −0.0428 −0.0524 0.0936 ** 
 (0.0329) (0.0311) (0.236) (0.0401) (0.0477) (0.150) (0.0360) 
Dummy 2010–2011 0.0371 −0.0349 −0.219 0.0128 −0.0413 −0.0490 0.0963 ** 
 (0.0370) (0.0360) (0.249) (0.0445) (0.0578) (0.173) (0.0379) 
Dummy 2012–2013 0.0422 −0.0317 −0.232 0.0190 −0.0425 −0.0826 0.103 ** 
 (0.0425) (0.0381) (0.256) (0.0472) (0.0621) (0.191) (0.0407) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1231 1245 1237 1245 1245 1240 1231 
R−squared 0.728 0.549 0.452 0.570 0.436 0.272 0.552 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Dependent variable: ஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబభమషభయି஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబబయషమబబఱ஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబబయషమబబఱ . Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 
2003–2005 (Year). 
Table 10. CSR convergence between countries with different legal origins. 















ln(Total Assets) −0.00743 −0.000194 0.0142 −0.00589 −0.0124 0.0570 0.000811 
 (0.00493) (0.00795) (0.0296) (0.00694) (0.00749) (0.0474) (0.00602) 
French Origins 0.125 *** 0.304 *** −0.00773 0.0919 −0.464 *** 0.235 ** 0.187 *** 
 (0.0430) (0.0388) (0.215) (0.0638) (0.105) (0.106) (0.0463) 
Scandinavian Origins 
−0.0599 0.0982 *** −0.301 0.0645 −0.534 *** −0.139 0.228 *** 
(0.0541) (0.0330) (0.225) (0.0721) (0.141) (0.141) (0.0535) 
German Origins −0.00368 0.193 *** −0.102 0.0908 * −0.465 *** 0.268 0.162 *** 
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 (0.0386) (0.0192) (0.179) (0.0491) (0.129) (0.261) (0.0306) 
GDP 0.00189 0.00417 0.0140 −0.00494 −0.000479 −0.00199 −0.00669 ** 
 (0.00303) (0.00265) (0.0147) (0.00373) (0.00812) (0.00915) (0.00301) 
G/GDP 2.17x10−05 0.00711 ** 0.00255 −0.00391 0.000981 −0.0249 ** −0.00275 
 (0.00248) (0.00253) (0.00753) (0.00369) (0.00687) (0.0116) (0.00311) 
Score Level (03–05) −0.0265 *** −0.0210 *** −0.0436 *** −0.0262 *** −0.0297 *** −0.0363 *** −0.0165 *** 
 (0.00140) (0.00262) (0.00704) (0.00382) (0.00731) (0.0117) (0.000924) 
Dummy 2006–2007 0.0451 −0.000488 −0.190 −0.0100 −0.0518 −0.166 0.0886 ** 
 (0.0276) (0.0256) (0.216) (0.0320) (0.0350) (0.163) (0.0314) 
Dummy 2008–2009 0.0341 −0.0328 −0.226 0.00604 −0.0511 −0.0998 0.101 ** 
 (0.0303) (0.0261) (0.246) (0.0397) (0.0465) (0.165) (0.0393) 
Dummy 2010–2011 0.0298 −0.0465 −0.251 0.00907 −0.0514 −0.106 0.106 ** 
 (0.0328) (0.0292) (0.262) (0.0441) (0.0570) (0.192) (0.0424) 
Dummy 2012–2013 0.0281 −0.0499 −0.271 0.0147 −0.0538 −0.145 0.112 ** 
 (0.0358) (0.0308) (0.271) (0.0459) (0.0599) (0.208) (0.0443) 
 0.0451 −0.000488 −0.190 −0.0100 −0.0518 −0.166 0.0886 ** 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1231 1245 1237 1245 1245 1240 1231 
R-squared 0.739 0.564 0.455 0.570 0.437 0.278 0.553 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Dependent variable: ஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబభమషభయି஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబబయషమబబఱ஼ௌோ೔,೟సమబబయషమబబఱ . Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 
2003–2005 (Year); English Origins. 
The observed convergence effect may be in part due to the fact that globalization reduced the 
influence of legal origins on corporate practices. Another plausible explanation for the convergence 
in the environment domain is the generalized adoption of world standards (i.e., the Forest 
Stewardship Council standard on the use of sustainable paper, which developed quite rapidly 
around the world). A third and related rationale is that companies have increasingly adopted 
benchmarking practices in their competitive strategies. The application of these to environmental 
standards may contribute to explaining both the reinforcement of global social norms on 
environmental sustainability and the convergence to common industry standards. All these potential 
explanations are not the main core of this paper and may indeed be a promising ground for further 
studies on CSR. 
To conclude this section, our hypotheses found empirical support also under the econometric 
analysis, taking into account industry heterogeneity and time structure of our dataset. Companies in 
common law countries performed better under community involvement and corporate governance 
criteria, while firms in countries with French legal origins received higher ratings in the human 
resources domain. Finally, under the environment criteria there was no significant difference among 
countries in terms of their legal origins, since in this domain they tended to converge more 
significantly than in the others to a common global industry standard.  
5.2. Robustness Checks 
A problem that usually arises when running the standard linear random effects model concerns 
the assumption of zero correlation between the firm characteristics ν௜ and all the other regressors. If 
this assumption can be realistic with respect to the legal origin variables, it may be posed under 
discussion when considering the other regressors. We could not solve the problem with a fixed effect 
model, since the effect of the (time-invariant) main variable of interest (Legal_Origin) would be 
absorbed in firm-specific intercepts. We therefore ran our robustness check by implementing 
Mundlak’s [43] approach. The latter implies the re-estimation of the random effect model with the 
addition of group-means of the time variant variables GDP, G/GDP, and Total Assets, which we 
named, respectively, 𝐺𝐷𝑃തതതതതത , 𝐺/𝐺𝐷𝑃തതതതതതതതതത  and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത . All the results were consistent with those 
commented in the previous sections and are reported in Tables 11,12, where the dependent variable 
was the firms’ CSR score (overall and in the specific sustainability drivers) and in Tables 13,14, where 
the dependent variable was firms’ deviation from their CSR industry average (overall and in the 
different sub-domains). For random effect estimations with Mundlak correction without industry 
dummies see Tables A3,A4 in Appendix A. 
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Table 11. Determinants of CSR over time: random effects (Mundlak correction). 















ln(Total Assets) −0.253 −0.186 0.0477 0.00778 0.158 −0.404 −0.673 
 (0.378) (0.640) (0.612) (0.584) (0.499) (0.861) (0.441) 
Civil Law −6.569 *** −0.124 −3.573 ** −2.753 *** −25.82 *** −6.569 *** −1.437 
 (1.265) (1.535) (1.720) (1.044) (2.944) (1.277) (1.018) 
GDP 0.521 ** 0.802 *** 0.376 0.703 *** 0.517 * 0.783 ** 0.704 *** 
 (0.252) (0.252) (0.298) (0.237) (0.308) (0.355) (0.270) 
G/GDP 0.171 * 0.0399 0.0374 0.104 0.138 0.525 * 0.292 ** 
 (0.0999) (0.0968) (0.120) (0.113) (0.208) (0.282) (0.117) 
Total Assetsതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.277 0.209 0.0490 0.0203 −0.195 0.538 0.731 
 (0.402) (0.673) (0.641) (0.626) (0.496) (0.870) (0.494) 
GDPതതതതതതത −0.621 ** −0.870 *** −0.664 * −0.790 *** −0.401 −0.978 *** −0.756 *** 
 (0.246) (0.250) (0.340) (0.252) (0.249) (0.334) (0.267) 
G/GDPതതതതതതതതതത 0.0214 0.271 0.129 0.0332 0.0576 −0.365 −0.0583 
 (0.149) (0.178) (0.171) (0.141) (0.280) (0.286) (0.132) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 134 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p <0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year). 
Table 12. Determinants of CSR over time: random effects (Mundlak correction). 















        
ln(Total Assets) −0.277 −0.263 0.0561 −0.0194 0.126 −0.444 −0.697 
 (0.386) (0.663) (0.64) (0.589) (0.520) (0.863) (0.453) 
French Origins −4.876 ** 4.421 ** −4.138 −1.472 −24.17 *** −4.532 ** −0.312 
 (1.981) (2.204) (2.855) (1.715) (3.193) (2.230) (1.851) 
Scandinavian Origins −6.365 *** −1.281 −4.204 −2.381 −23.09 *** −12.37 *** −0.482 
 (2.461) (2.784) (3.139) (2.223) (3.731) (2.419) (2.766) 
German Origins −7.472 *** −2.305 −3.193 ** −3.463 *** −27.05*** −6.841 *** −2.145 ** 
 (1.315) (1.567) (1.594) (1.094) (3.267) (1.088) (1.030) 
GDP 0.494 ** 0.715 *** 0.385 0.674 *** 0.485 * 0.729 ** 0.681 ** 
 (0.248) (0.220) (0.303) (0.233) (0.287) (0.357) (0.266) 
G/GDP 0.160 * 0.00280 0.0418 0.0909 0.120 0.510 * 0.280 ** 
 (0.0969) (0.0871) (0.120) (0.111) (0.202) (0.281) (0.113) 
Total Assetsതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.311 0.309 0.0366 0.0542 −0.151 0.582 0.761 
 (0.413) (0.703) (0.645) (0.635) (0.520) (0.871) (0.510) 
GDPതതതതതതത −0.591 ** −0.746 *** −0.665 * −0.764 *** −0.412 * −0.814 ** −0.746 *** 
 (0.250) (0.222) (0.354) (0.258) (0.241) (0.346) (0.263) 
G/GDPതതതതതതതതതത −0.00297 0.242 * 0.147 0.0144 −0.00705 −0.284 −0.0861 
 (0.141) (0.129) (0.167) (0.141) (0.285) (0.261) (0.122) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year); English Origins. 
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Table 13. Determinants of deviations from industry average CSR: random effects (Mundlak 
correction). 















ln(Total Assets) −0.0264 0.339 −0.248 0.463 0.518 −0.118 −0.544 
 (0.274) (0.480) (0.408) (0.423) (0.542) (0.516) (0.537) 
Civil Law −6.020 *** −0.0562 −3.404 ** −2.364 ** −23.30 *** −5.899 *** −1.438 
 (1.186) (1.317) (1.599) (0.982) (3.011) (1.069) (0.911) 
GDP 0.410 0.692 *** 0.372 0.600 ** 0.295 0.390 0.613 *** 
 (0.269) (0.264) (0.313) (0.249) (0.324) (0.341) (0.218) 
G/GDP 0.0736 0.0205 0.144 0.0621 −0.0908 0.151 0.199 ** 
 (0.0880) (0.104) (0.116) (0.0988) (0.115) (0.124) (0.0897) 
Total Assetsതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.0537 −0.309 0.298 −0.409 −0.511 0.204 0.597 
 (0.297) (0.503) (0.440) (0.458) (0.538) (0.529) (0.579) 
GDPതതതതതതത −0.507 ** −0.745 *** −0.615 * −0.664 *** −0.202 −0.619 * −0.670 *** 
 (0.254) (0.250) (0.338) (0.242) (0.264) (0.321) (0.210) 
G/GDPതതതതതതതതതത 0.0868 0.239 0.0389 0.0634 0.239 −0.0741 0.0144 
 (0.127) (0.160) (0.163) (0.126) (0.219) (0.131) (0.0984) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year). 
Table 14. Determinants of deviations from industry average CSR: random effects (Mundlak 
correction). 















ln(Total Assets) −0.0534 0.266 −0.234 0.442 0.474 −0.161 −0.569 
 (0.285) (0.509) (0.412) (0.429) (0.553) (0.514) (0.550) 
French Origins −4.528 *** 3.706 ** −4.142 −1.392 −21.34 *** −3.969 ** −0.379 
 (1.752) (1.815) (2.527) (1.521) (2.934) (1.861) (1.573) 
Scandinavian Origins −5.843 *** −0.985 −4.071 −2.367 −21.02 *** −10.82 *** −0.0674 
 (2.138) (2.438) (2.739) (1.997) (3.478) (1.888) (2.341) 
German Origins −6.813 *** −1.865 −2.932 ** −2.865 *** −24.61 *** −6.244 *** −2.166 ** 
 (1.242) (1.393) (1.402) (1.043) (3.367) (0.887) (0.911) 
GDP 0.381 0.609 *** 0.387 0.577 ** 0.251 0.333 0.589 *** 
 (0.261) (0.219) (0.315) (0.246) (0.304) (0.334) (0.205) 
G/GDP 0.0606 −0.0159 0.151 0.0518 −0.115 0.134 0.186 ** 
 (0.0837) (0.0969) (0.115) (0.0970) (0.107) (0.115) (0.0856) 
Total Assetsതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.0888 −0.218 0.279 −0.383 −0.454 0.250 0.629 
 (0.312) (0.540) (0.447) (0.466) (0.547) (0.527) (0.596) 
GDPതതതതതതത −0.476 * −0.633 *** −0.621 * −0.638 ** −0.194 −0.468 −0.668 *** 
 (0.254) (0.213) (0.344) (0.248) (0.261) (0.328) (0.194) 
G/GDPതതതതതതതതതത 0.0676 0.218 * 0.0584 0.0544 0.182 −0.00436 −0.0188 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.156) (0.127) (0.229) (0.0964) (0.0910) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year); English Origins. 
Another potential bias in our estimates (arising from the sample composition of the VIGEO data) 
derived from non-random attrition, since the probability that firms entered and exited our panel may 
have depended on observable and/or unobservable factors possibly correlated with the main variable 
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of interest (the CSR scores). In order to reduce this potential bias in the main estimates, we first 
estimated the firms’ attrition probability, controlling for year, sector, and country effects with the 
addition of the country per-capita GDP and a proxy for the difficulty of doing business in a given 
country (i.e., the number of procedures necessary to start up a new business). These data vary at 
yearly basis and were taken from the “Doing Business” panel available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/custom-query--variable: Starting a Business (Procedures Numbers). 
We then used the predicted attrition probabilities to (inversely) weight each observation. The 
weights were constructed as 1/p(Ai), where p(Ai) is the estimated probability of attrition for each firm. 
With such a weighting method, each observation in the main equation is inversely weighted by its 
attrition probability so that less importance in the estimation is given to those firms more likely to 
attrite.  
Estimation results of the attrition probit model and of the main CSR equations through pooled 
OLS and weighted least squares (WLS) are reported, respectively, in column A and columns 1–14 of 
Table 15. Since, in general, WLS estimates did not significantly differ from the pooled OLS ones and 
were consistent with those reported in Tables 5,6, we can conclude that firms’ non-random attrition 
was not likely to be the main driver of our results.  
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Table 15. Determinants of CSR: correction for attrition bias. 
  (A)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 











   PANEL A 
GDP −0.13 *** French Or. −4.48 * −3.75 * 5.64 ** 7.12 *** −4.10 −3.05 −0.88 −0.19 −23.7 *** −23.7 *** −3.7 −2.60 0.19 1.02 
 (0.01)  (2.245) (2.08) (2.45) (2.33) (3.08) (2.89) (1.88) (1.6) (2.98) (2.65) (2.46) (2.23) (2.17) (2.2) 
N. proc.  
to start  
a business 
0.09 *** Scand. Or. −8.29 *** −9.07 *** −2.91 −3.26 −7.27 * −8.05 ** −3.56 −3.62 −24 *** −24.5 *** −13.9 *** −14.82 *** −2.37 −3.7 
(0.02)  (2.68) (2.69) (2.84) (2.88) (3.59) (3.78) (2.24) (2.23) (3.55) (3.18) (2.70) (2.71) (2.82) (3.11) 
 German Or. −6.15 *** −5.9 *** −0.01 1.00 −2.18 −1.95 −2.62 ** −2.63 ** −25.4 *** −25.4 *** −6.18 *** −5.734 *** −0.96 −0.52 
   (1.56) (1.42) (1.94) (2.04) (1.87) (1.73) (1.24) (1.18) (2.95) (2.49) (1.47) (1.37) (1.27) (1.45) 
                 
Year d. YES Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry d. YES Year d. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country d. YES Industry d. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 18,673 Obs 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 
   PANEL B 
  Civil Law −5.76 *** −5.40 *** 1.66 2.756 −3.22 −2.77 −2.11 * −1.88 * −24.72 *** −24.72 *** −5.94 *** −5.345 *** −0.68 −0.23 
   (1.50) (1.37) (1.53) (1.63) (2.17) (2.00) (1.19) (1.03) (2.63) (2.24) (1.59) (1.49) (1.26) (1.32) 
  Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Year d. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Industry d. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Obs. 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 5908 5888 
Notes: [1] model (A): robust standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses; [2] models (1−14): robust standard errors clustered at country level 
are reported in parentheses; the weights for the WLS models were calculated as 1/P(Ai), where P(Ai) is the predicted attrition probability from the attrition prob. 
model in column (A); [4] *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. [5] Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2004 (Year); English Origins (Panel A). [6] Controls: Total 
Assets, GDP, G/GDP; [6] OLS = Ordinary Least Squares (pooled); WLS = Weighted Least Squares. 
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Table 16. Robustness checks. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Variables Overall score Human resources Environment Business behavior Corporate governance Community involvement Human rights 
French Origins 0.781 −2.707 9.402 *** 6.029 ** 3.150 −1.623 2.740 −0.200 −17.42 *** −23.45 *** 2.450 −3.546 5.064 * 0.964 
 (3.082) (2.915) (3.402) (2.796) (3.797) (2.923) (2.363) (2.453) (4.723) (4.830) (3.575) (3.552) (2.831) (2.365) 
Scandinavian Origins −1.124 −5.860 4.280 −0.389 0.973 −3.838 1.343 −2.269 −15.06 *** −23.27 *** −7.249 ** −13.87 *** 4.228 −1.170 
 (3.277) (3.696) (2.751) (3.229) (3.983) (3.557) (2.543) (2.831) (5.142) (5.776) (3.465) (4.331) (2.995) (3.079) 
German Origins −8.360 ** −9.413 ** −1.960 −4.464 −0.626 −4.762 −2.966 −4.359 −34.87 *** −31.05 *** −7.392 * −10.08 ** −1.726 −3.555 
 (3.771) (3.846) (3.535) (4.285) (3.424) (3.468) (2.580) (2.739) (8.314) (6.408) (3.870) (4.524) (2.972) (3.085) 
Total Assets  0.222  0.218 **  0.400 *  0.226 **  −0.142  0.254  0.116 
  (0.149)  (0.103)  (0.208)  (0.108)  (0.218)  (0.235)  (0.124) 
ROA  1.882 *  2.124  4.358 ***  0.268  −1.420  1.782 **  0.617 
  (0.984)  (1.298)  (0.579)  (1.877)  (2.075)  (0.857)  (1.237) 
NPM sector  −0.0920 ***  0.0164  −0.143 ***  −0.174 ***  −0.149 ***  −0.130 ***  0.0618 *** 
  (0.00667)  (0.0174)  (0.0186)  (0.00982)  (0.00900)  (0.0260)  (0.0158) 
Inflation Rate  −0.389  −0.871  −0.945  −0.441  1.096 **  −0.966  −0.774 
  (0.445)  (0.828)  (0.588)  (0.473)  (0.489)  (0.734)  (0.509) 
GDP  0.143  0.102  −0.196 *  0.0975  0.452  0.148  0.180 
  (0.129)  (0.141)  (0.105)  (0.0983)  (0.286)  (0.140)  (0.129) 
G/GDP  0.343 **  0.297 *  0.293 **  0.231 *  0.679 ***  0.495 ***  0.382 *** 
  (0.134)  (0.163)  (0.127)  (0.123)  (0.245)  (0.181)  (0.121) 
Industry dummies 
(COMPUSTAT) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
               
Observations 3801 3627 4194 3980 4194 3980 4194 3980 4194 3980 4194 3980 3801 3627 
Number of Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Number of Firms 978 950 985 957 985 957 985 957 985 957 985 957 978 950 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry-
COMPUSTAT); 2003 (Year); English Origins. NPM: Net Profit Margin at industry level; ROA: Return on assets. 
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Finally, in order to check whether our main findings were driven by VIGEO’s industry 
classification, other macroeconomic country-specific characteristics, or firm/industry-specific 
features, we re-estimated our baseline specification in Table 6 by controlling for industry categories, 
firms’ profitability (i.e., return on assets, ROA), and industrial concentration (proxied for by industry 
net-profit margins, NPM) from the COMPUSTAT dataset, as well as for the country inflation rate 
(inflation_rate) calculated on a yearly basis by the World Bank. As in Giroud and Mueller [44], 
industry net-profit margins have been calculated as the ratio between firms’ “Operating Income 
Before Depreciation” and “Sales” averaged at industry level (data source: COMPUSTAT). 
The new estimation results are shown in Table 16. Overall, despite the loss of several 
observations after merging the VIGEO and COMPUSTAT datasets, our core findings were still robust 
to the introduction of the new controls. Incidentally, high industrial concentration was associated 
with reduced CSR performance in all the domains but the human rights one. This last evidence only 
partially supports Campbell’s [45] hypothesis that firms act in a less socially responsible way if there 
is either too much or too little competition. To better test the Campbell’s hypothesis about a non-
linear effect of sector competition on firm’s CSR behaviour, in a different specification, we introduced 
the square of NPM and found that the latter is not significant (available upon request). Similar 
evidence against a non-linear relationship between CSR and competition is shown by Chih et al. [46].  
A demand-based interpretation for the negative correlation between concentration and CSR-
performance in the majority of CSR-domains is that when competition is low (and stakeholders face 
few alternatives) firms have fewer incentives to invest in “strategic philanthropy” to signal their 
competitive advantages (see, among others, Shleifer [47] and Porter and Kramer [48]). Conversely, a 
possible explanation for the positive impact of industrial concentration on CSR performance in the 
human rights domain may derive from a combination of several domain-specific factors 
counterbalancing the absence of alternatives for the consumers disappointed with firm’s unethical 
behavior, i.e., for instance, the stricter international regulations protecting human rights relative to 
international standards in other domains, the higher visibility to the public opinion of human rights 
violations (with the consequent higher risk of a bad reputation for the deviating firm), the higher the 
sensitivity of the average consumer (even if less educated) to the firm’s acts against human rights, 
etc. A relevant example on this point is the “Behind the brands” Oxfam’s campaign on the 10 largest 
food industries. Oxfam developed social and environmental ratings for such companies and asked 
citizens to take actions by sending e-mails to them for approval/disapproval of their behaviour. After 
one year of campaign around 426,000 actions were taken and 9 out 10 companies announced the 
decision to improve their CSR practices. This is an example on how higher visibility to the public 
opinion may lead global companies with higher market power to have relatively more developed 
CSR policies (http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/campaigns/behind-brands accessed at 27 of May 2014). 
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
Corporate social responsibility is an emerging and growing phenomenon in contemporary 
globally integrated economies [49]. In spite of its increasing importance, there are fewer theoretical 
and empirical analyses on the impact that different legal origins may have on the implementation of 
CSR practices in the different CSR domains. Our paper aimed to bridge this gap by providing an 
original contribution to both the CSR and the legal origin literature.  
We started by wondering whether the two different (civil and common) law traditions may have 
intrinsic characteristics that justify different patterns of the adoption of CSR practices. Based on the 
history of the two different cultures and on the established results in the literature, we formulated 
the hypothesis that the Anglo-Saxon tradition of corporate philanthropy could tilt the balance toward 
common law countries in the related CSR domain (community involvement). We argued that this 
may be the case since, as is well known, in the distribution of benefits from corporate action, common 
law is much more oriented toward shareholder protection, while civil law (especially in the French 
family) toward workers’ rights. 
Our descriptive and econometric findings document evidence (even not univocal) in the three 
indicated directions. More specifically, controlling for industry average characteristics and time fixed 
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effects, the common law legal origin is positively and significantly correlated with the corporate 
governance and community involvement domains, while the French family in the civil law tradition 
is positively associated with the human resources domain (the CSR domain mostly concerning the 
workers’ rights).  
We finally observed no influence of legal origins on the environmental domain. We provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that this “non result” was the outcome of a remarkable process of 
convergence between the two legal origin groups. We further documented that convergence actually 
occurred in all domains but—consistently with Meyer’s [42] theoretical predictions—it canceled out 
legal origin effects only in the environment and in the business behavior domains. We interpreted 
this last evidence in three ways. First, globalization reduces the influence of country-of-origin effects 
(producing convergence both within and between legal origin areas). Second, in some specific 
domains, such as that of environmental sustainability, the emergence of a global social norm 
(probably fostered by the creation and generalized voluntary adoption of some international 
standards) rapidly reduced differences among corporations coming from different legal cultures. 
Third, the increased use of benchmarking practices reinforces processes of creation of global social 
norms around commonly accepted environmental standards.  
Overall, the policy implications of our results are that demand-driven pressure on social and 
environmental concerns, benchmarking practices, and global social norms are key factors that can 
increase corporate attention in contributing to the production of public goods and in addressing 
externalities. Hence, our findings suggest that the solution of global problems may not depend just 
on top-down institutional action but on the complex interplay of four forces, namely the market, 
institutions, active citizenship creating demand pressure on corporations, and corporate 
responsibility. 
A limitation in our research is that we did not have instrumental variable estimates that could 
verify the causality nexus in the relationship between legal origins and corporate social responsibility. 
However, given that legal origins trace back in the past and can be hardly suspected of being 
determined by other drivers also affecting CSR, we are confident that our findings revealed a 
causality nexus. Nevertheless, further research in this direction is indeed welcome and would 
significantly contribute to enrich this field of the literature. 
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Appendix A. 
Table A1. Determinants of deviations from average industry CSR over time: random effects. 















ln(Total Assets) 0.0438 0.115 ** 0.0646 0.119 ** 0.104 0.130 0.0323 
 (0.0537) (0.0581) (0.0776) (0.0565) (0.0850) (0.0983) (0.0676) 
Civil Law −3.899 *** −0.162 −3.009 *** −1.528 * −14.05 *** −4.490 *** −0.853 
 (1.032) (1.551) (1.154) (0.823) (3.314) (0.923) (1.061) 
GDP −0.116 * −0.00781 −0.166 ** −0.0457 −0.354 −0.227 *** −0.00955 
 (0.0602) (0.0772) (0.0664) (0.0549) (0.218) (0.0581) (0.0586) 
G/GDP 0.0296 0.0938 0.113 0.0503 −0.0725 0.00168 0.0960 
 (0.0649) (0.108) (0.0857) (0.0522) (0.122) (0.0803) (0.0749) 
Industry dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations 6757 7747 7747 7747 7747 7747 6757 
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Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1,35 1835 1835 1835 1835 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year). 
Table A2. Determinants of deviations from average industry CSR over time: random effects. 















ln(Total Assets) 0.0511 0.128 ** 0.0535 0.122 ** 0.119 0.134 0.0356 
 (0.0547) (0.0560) (0.0805) (0.0584) (0.0823) (0.103) (0.0653) 
French Origins −2.668 2.386 −4.210 ** −0.763 −12.50 *** −2.823 * −0.251 
 (1.742) (2.358) (1.852) (1.181) (4.061) (1.620) (1.551) 
Scandinavian Origins −4.230 ** −1.907 −4.929 ** −2.379 −10.06 *** −8.776 *** −0.959 
 (1.846) (2.265) (2.444) (1.665) (3.845) (1.516) (2.127) 
German Origins −4.391 *** −0.918 −1.897 −1.668 * −15.84 *** −4.157 *** −1.099 
 (1.071) (1.567) (1.362) (0.957) (3.238) (0.969) (1.344) 
GDP −0.115 * 0.00734 −0.141 ** −0.0373 −0.404 * −0.178 *** −0.00941 
 (0.0620) (0.0751) (0.0634) (0.0560) (0.218) (0.0543) (0.0605) 
G/GDP 0.000971 0.0475 0.173 ** 0.0412 −0.176 0.0190 0.0802 
 (0.0634) (0.0957) (0.0735) (0.0546) (0.136) (0.0615) (0.0657) 
Industry dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 7747 7747 7747 7747 7747 6757 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year); English Origins. 
Table A3. Determinants of deviations from average industry CSR: random effects (Mundlak 
correction). 
















ln(Total Assets) −0.0258 0.859 ** −0.0550 0.556 * 1.086 ** 0.562 −0.641 
 (0.285) (0.361) (0.471) (0.318) (0.486) (0.432) (0.494) 
Civil Law −4.424 *** −0.563 −3.038 ** −1.906 ** −14.71 *** −4.728 *** −1.243 
 (0.912) (1.590) (1.245) (0.868) (2.861) (0.916) (1.161) 
GDP 0.217 0.138 −0.0300 0.233 0.247 0.0788 0.331 
 (0.242) (0.227) (0.256) (0.231) (0.327) (0.272) (0.202) 
G/GDP 0.0208 −0.0283 0.210 0.0505 0.0324 0.0915 0.101 
 (0.0748) (0.152) (0.151) (0.0864) (0.173) (0.128) (0.0817) 
Total Assetsതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.0805 −0.798 ** 0.131 −0.466 −1.055 ** −0.454 0.710 
 (0.307) (0.406) (0.505) (0.343) (0.484) (0.482) (0.535) 
GDPതതതതതതത −0.360 −0.156 −0.146 −0.293 −0.632 * −0.312 −0.359 ** 
 (0.222) (0.205) (0.238) (0.198) (0.331) (0.244) (0.174) 
G/GDPതതതതതതതതതത −0.00317 0.146 −0.143 −0.0220 −0.188 −0.137 −0.0198 
 (0.0911) (0.176) (0.163) (0.111) (0.205) (0.144) (0.0856) 
 −0.0258 0.859 ** −0.0550 0.556 * 1.086 ** 0.562 −0.641 
Industry dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of 
Countries 
27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Number of Firms 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year. 
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Table A4. Determinants of deviations from average industry CSR: random effects (Mundlak 
correction). 















ln(Total Assets) −0.0453 0.824 ** −0.0241 0.553 * 1.053 ** 0.552 −0.649 
 (0.296) (0.377) (0.479) (0.319) (0.487) (0.437) (0.510) 
French Origins −3.606 ** 1.807 −4.551 ** −1.600 −13.95 *** −3.332 ** −0.991 
 (1.504) (2.112) (1.854) (1.125) (3.709) (1.566) (1.400) 
Scandinavian Origins −4.542 *** −2.355 −4.794 ** −2.564 −9.844 *** −8.695 *** −1.177 
 (1.702) (2.212) (2.345) (1.630) (3.306) (1.454) (2.196) 
German Origins −4.685 *** −0.974 −2.056 −1.852 * −16.21 *** −4.249 *** −1.351 
 (1.084) (1.627) (1.422) (1.034) (2.807) (1.040) (1.455) 
GDP −0.0453 0.824 ** −0.0241 0.553 * 1.053 ** 0.552 −0.649 
 (0.296) (0.377) (0.479) (0.319) (0.487) (0.437) (0.510) 
G/GDP −3.606 ** 1.807 −4.551 ** −1.600 −13.95 *** −3.332 ** −0.991 
 (1.504) (2.112) (1.854) (1.125) (3.709) (1.566) (1.400) 
Total Assetsതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത −4.542 *** −2.355 −4.794 ** −2.564 −9.844 *** −8.695 *** −1.177 
 (1.702) (2.212) (2.345) (1.630) (3.306) (1.454) (2.196) 
GDPതതതതതതത −4.685 *** −0.974 −2.056 −1.852 * −16.21 *** −4.249 *** −1.351 
 (1.084) (1.627) (1.422) (1.034) (2.807) (1.040) (1.455) 
G/GDPതതതതതതതതതത −0.0453 0.824 ** −0.0241 0.553 * 1.053 ** 0.552 −0.649 
 (0.296) (0.377) (0.479) (0.319) (0.487) (0.437) (0.510) 
Industry dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 6757 
Number of Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of Firms 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 
Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. Omitted categories: Aerospace (Industry); 2003 (Year); English Origins. 
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Table A5. Legal Origins and CSR scores in all sustainability drivers. 
Panel A 
  HR1 HR2 HR3 HR4 HR5 HR6 HR7 HR8       
Civil law 9.535 *** −6.139 ** 4.025 3.252 * 2.194 2.705 * −6.445 *** 2.964       
  ENV1 ENV2 ENV3 ENV4 ENV5 ENV6 ENV7 ENV8 ENV9 ENV10 ENV11 
Civil law −3.616 −0.0143 1.497 −2.568 −2.836 0.751 −3.433 7.250 *** −4.082 0.537 −4.009 * 
  CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10   
Civil law 5.054 *** −4.077 *** −7.143 *** −1.013 −2.081 −0.967 −2.601 −3.368 * 0.305 −0.422  
  CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4               
Civil law −26.60 *** −19.34 *** −19.66 *** −35.41 ***               
 CIN1 CIN2 CIN3         
Civil law −4.468 *** −6.011 *** −12.30 ***                 
 HRT1 HRT2 HRT3         
Civil law 1.068 2.960 *** −3.920 **                
Panel B 
 HR1 HR2 HR3 HR4 HR5 HR6 HR7 HR8    
French Origins 15.18 *** −6.555 6.843 ** 8.163 *** 8.483 ** 3.588 −1.682 1.986    
Scandinavian Origins 6.793 * −0.634 −7.930 * −0.372 −1.028 3.291 −6.527 ** −2.996    
German Origins 6.569 * −5.593 0.0958 1.595 −0.742 1.739 −9.213 *** 4.269 **      
 ENV1 ENV2 ENV3 ENV4 ENV5 ENV6 ENV7 ENV8 ENV9 ENV10 ENV11 
French Origins −4.681 5.501 2.282 −0.711 6.391 −3.542 10.66 *** −4.032 7.125 ** −6.705 * −3.746 
Scandinavian Origins −4.162 0.574 −3.848 −3.878 1.994 −5.774 * 7.010 ** −3.807 −3.782 −6.872 * −5.549 * 
German Origins −2.822 −2.918 * 2.192 −3.537 * −2.288 −2.885 5.669 *** −4.179 −1.338 −1.898 −1.092 
 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10  
French Origins 6.316 ** −2.964 −2.324 0.950 −1.885 1.901 −1.153 −1.238 −0.244 −0.185  
Scandinavian Origins 3.951 −3.376 −13.71 *** −3.298 −1.301 0.645 −4.510 * −4.666 −1.005 −3.113 **  
German Origins 4.608 *** −4.810 *** −8.361 *** −1.922 −2.405 −2.889 ** −3.071 −4.393 ** 0.802 −0.181   
 CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4        
French Origins −25.68 *** −10.39 *** −22.41 *** −35.19 ***        
Scandinavian Origins −11.33 ** −21.15 *** −30.48 *** −36.69 ***        
German Origins −30.26 *** −24.07 *** −16.07 *** −35.31 ***               
 CIN1 CIN2 CIN3         
French Origins −0.483 −2.545 −11.67 ***         
Scandinavian Origins −9.666 *** −15.85 *** −21.77 ***         
German Origins −5.349 *** −6.356 *** −11.50 ***                 
 HRT1 HRT2 HRT3         
French Origins −0.503 6.063 *** −2.061         
Scandinavian Origins 2.461 3.806 ** −5.582         
German Origins 1.946 1.097 −4.720 ***                
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Legend: HR1: Promotion of labor relations; HR2: Encouraging employee participation; HR3: Training and development; HR4: Responsible management and 
restructurings; HR5: Career management and promotion of employability; HR6: Quality of remuneration systems; HR7: Improvement of health and safety 
conditions; HR8: Respect and management of working hours; ENV1: Environmental strategy and eco-design; ENV2: Pollution prevention and control; ENV3: 
Development of green products and services; ENV4: Protection of biodiversity; ENV5: Protection of water resources; ENV6: Minimizing environmental impacts 
from energy use; ENV7: Management of atmospheric emissions; ENV8: Waste management; ENV9: Management of environmental nuisances: dust, odor, noise; 
ENV10: Management of environmental impact from transportation; ENV11: Management of environmental impact from the use and disposal of products/services; 
CS1: Product safety; CS2: Information customers; CS4: Responsible contractual agreement; CS3: Sustainable relationship with supplies; CS4: Integration of 
Environmental factors in the supply chain; CS5: Integration of social factors in the supply chain; CS6: Prevention of corruption; CS7: Prevention of anti-competitive 
practices; CS8: Transparency and integrity of influence strategies and practices; CG1: Board of Director; CG2: Audit and Internal Control; CG3: Shareholders Rights; 
CG4: Executive Remuneration; CIN1: Promotion of social and economic development; CIN2: Social impacts of company products and services; CIN3: Contribution 
to general interest causes; HRT1: Respect for human rights standards and prevention of violations; HRT2: Respect for freedom of association and their right to 
collective bargaining; HRT3: Non-discrimination. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Appendix B. VIGEO Rating Domains and Sustainability Drivers. 
Human Resources. Promotion of labor relations: company’s commitment to ensuring the 
respect of independent workers’ representatives through information, consultation, and notably 
collective bargaining, at the workplace. Encouraging employee participation: company’s 
commitment to defend and promote employees’ individual information and expression, and 
employees’ participation in decision-making on matters not related to collective bargaining. 
Responsible management of restructurings: capability to inform and consult employee 
representatives before/during restructuring process, to put in place practical measures, to prevent 
and limit redundancies (notably budgets, processes, and reporting), and to take measures to mitigate 
the negative effects of redundancies on employees, notably reemployment measures. Career 
management and promotion of employability: company efforts to anticipate short- and long-term 
employment needs and skill requirements, adapt employees’ skill sets to their career paths, enable 
the progressive improvement in employees’ qualification levels, and put in place a concerted career 
management framework, which is transparent and individualized. Quality of remuneration 
systems: company’s commitment to ensure the decency, transparency, and objectivity of employees’ 
remuneration systems. Improvement of health and safety conditions: company’s commitment 
regarding the protection of employees’ health and safety. Respect and management of working 
hours: initiatives taken by the company to promote the voluntary flexibility of working hours. 
Environment. Environmental strategy and eco-design: company’s commitment to define clear 
objectives and appropriate measures to ensure management of the environmental impacts of 
products and services. Pollution retention and control: extent to which the company is preventing 
and managing risks of accidental pollution or soil pollution. Development of green products and 
services: company’s efforts to develop: i) products and services with significantly decreased 
environmental impact; and ii) that may be considered as a fundamental diversification for the 
enterprise, either at the level of the production process (wind turbine for electricity producers), or at 
the product (hydrogen for oil producers or fuel cells for car makers) or at service level (green 
investment funds in banking sector). Protection of biodiversity: company’s commitment to prevent 
risks of endangering biodiversity. Company’s commitment to manage animal testing (when relevant 
for the sector). Protection of water resources: measures taken to reduce water consumption and to 
improve, reduce, or treat wastewater emissions/water discharges. Minimizing environmental 
impacts from energy use: company’s efforts to address and minimize energy-related issues (energy 
consumption and emissions related to energy consumption). Management of atmospheric 
emissions: steps taken by the company to control atmospheric emissions related to the production of 
products/projects/services. Atmospheric emissions resulting from the company’s energy 
consumption are out of the scope of this criterion, see: 2.2—Minimizing environmental impacts from 
energy use and related atmospheric emissions. Waste management: Steps taken by companies to 
manage waste: i) identification of the different sources of waste; ii) reduction of waste production at 
source; iii) management of industrial and commercial packaging and packaging waste; iv) waste 
recycling, energy recovery from waste (waste to energy); v) reduce the toxicity of hazardous waste. 
Management of environmental nuisances: dust, odor, noise (Management of local pollution): 
company management and reduction of local pollution (noise, dust, and odors) resulting from the 
production processes and maintenance of installations, as well as local degradation of the 
environmental aesthetics. Management of environmental impact from transportation: company 
effort and results when taking into account environmental impact of its products’ transportation and 
actions that are implemented to reduce these impacts. 
Business Behavior. Product safety: corporate attention to product safety issues into account, 
and the related steps taken to prevent and repair emergency/crisis situations affecting product safety. 
Information customers: definition and implementation of principles of conduct and measures to 
prevent negative impact of marketing practices on financial, moral, and ethical issues as well as on 
the health and safety of users and/or customers. Responsible contractual agreement: corporate 
commitment to include guarantees in its contractual relationship, which promote customers’ freedom 
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of decision, satisfaction, and right to recourse. Sustainable relationship with suppliers: corporate 
commitment to ensure balanced and sustainable relationships with suppliers, focusing on: i) 
promoting mutually beneficial business relations; ii) optimizing mutual profits gained through 
contract in terms of quality, costs, and technical/technological control. Integration of environmental 
factors in the supply chain: Evaluation of the extent to which the company integrates environmental 
factors in the supply chain. Integration of social factors in the supply chain: Evaluation of the extent 
to which the company is integrating social standards into supply chain. Prevention of corruption: 
effectiveness of the company’s anti-corruption management system. Corruption is studied in its 
broadest sense. Conflicts of interest are also taken into account, as they can cast doubt on the quality 
of the company decision-making process and on the integrity of people involved. Prevention of anti-
competitive practices: corporate consideration for competition laws and the prevention of market 
distortion rules in its relationships with customers, suppliers, and competitors. Transparency and 
integrity of influence strategies and practices: corporate disclosure of the objectives of its lobbying 
practices and the resources dedicated to achieving them. Appointment of clear responsibilities and 
designation of specific procedures to monitor the correct implementation of the company’s lobbying 
strategy. 
Corporate Governance. Board of Directors: corporate commitment to set up a board of directors 
that is capable of controlling and advising executives and that is held accountable to shareholders. 
Audit and Internal Control: corporate commitment to establish effective risk management systems, 
ensuring the quality of internal reporting, and the extent to which this commitment is reflected in 
financial information provided to the public. The board of directors is responsible for the objectivity 
and relevance of the system. Shareholders Rights: corporate commitment to ensure the fair treatment 
of shareholders, allowing them to actively participate in strategic decision-making. Voting rights 
attached to shares and the right to participate in general meetings are of fundamental importance in 
this regard. Executive Remuneration: corporate commitment to use executive remuneration as a tool 
to align the interests of executives and shareholders. 
Community Involvement. Promotion of social and economic development: corporate 
commitment to provide sustainable contributions to the economic and social development of local 
areas and to optimize the economic and social impact of activities: local investment, promotion of 
local employment, transfer of technologies and skills. Social impacts of company products and 
services: development of voluntary initiatives taking into account their product or services’ impact 
on the community. Contribution to general interest causes: corporate commitments to promote 
voluntary community initiatives not directly related to the company’s products or services: 
patronage, involvement in various causes of general interest, other forms of sponsorship, as well as 
contributions to studies or academic research on community interest issues. 
Human Rights. Respect for human rights standards and prevention of violations: extent to 
which the company is complying with obligation to respect human rights in the community 
(community taken as a whole, i.e., within and outside of the workplace). This obligation includes: 
respect of effective exercise of fundamental human rights and personal rights; prevention of human 
rights violations or complicity of violations. Respect for freedom of association and their right to 
collective bargaining: respect of trade union freedom, collective bargaining rights, and promotion of 
collective bargaining rights. Elimination of child and forced labor: corporate contribution to the 
elimination of child labor and/or forced labor. Non-discrimination: corporate prevention of gender 
discrimination on workplace and other discrimination regarding work conditions, vocational 
training, promotion, fees, and other benefits. Positive measures and specific measures intended to 
protect and support women (pregnancy, maternity) or vulnerable people, constitute measures to 
promote equal opportunity and treatment. 
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